Introduction
The clear conflict of interest presented by the President of the United States controlling the appointment and removal of the Attorney General, who is entrusted with prosecutorial oversight over the President and his top appointees, gives lie to any claim that no U.S. office holder is above the law. The argument that this conflict is controlled by countervailing interests and powers in the legislative and judicial branches of government and by the political process has been debunked by the impunity which George W. Bush administration officials have had been implicated in so many alleged criminal activities that a popular news website, Slate, created a multi-color, interactive graphic to chart possible criminal charges and the high-level executive branch officials who might be facing indictment for, among other activities, approving torture, illegally wiretapping U.S. citizens, and politicizing Department of Justice hirings and firings. 2 The existence of such an array of possible criminal activity by a twoterm administration is less remarkable than the fact that, in a country that prides itself in being a nation "of laws and not men," 3 none of these accusations had led to the prosecution of a single high-level executive branch official. 4 A particularly notorious example of unprosecuted criminal activity in the Bush executive branch was the explicit and repeated authorization for agents of the Central Intelligence
Agency to physically and emotionally abuse al-Qaeda suspects. The acts which were officially approved by the Bush Administration Department of Justice included:
• Slamming suspects into walls
• Slapping and grabbing suspects
• Placing detainees in small "confinement boxes" for up to 18 hours • Placing of insects in the confinement boxes with detainees
• Compelling detainees to remain in "stress positions" for hours at a time
• Depriving detainees of sleep for as many as 11 days at a time
• Waterboarding, which produces the sensation of drowning and suffocation 5 According to a heavily redacted 2004 report from the Central Intelligence Agency Office of the Inspector General, made public in 2009, the issuance of these guidelines by the Department of Justice was followed by CIA agents using the waterboarding technique on one suspect 183 times in a single month, 6 and on another suspect 83 times in a single month, 7 while the waterboarding technique used larger volumes of water than prescribed, along with extra efforts to block the detainees' air flow. 8 In addition, detainees were threatened with a power drill and handgun, 9 were told that their daughters and mothers would be sexually abused in front of them, 10 and that the detainees' children would be killed if another attack occurred on the U.S. after 9/11. 11 Detainees were choked, 12 subjected to mock executions, 13 left in extreme cold while shackled and naked, 14 and beaten with rifle butts and large metal flashlights. Water is 'then applied to the cloth in a controlled manner. As this is done, the cloth is lowered until it covers both the nose and mouth. Once the cloth is saturated and completely covers the mouth and nose, the air flow is slightly restricted for 20 to 40 seconds due to the presence of the cloth. This causes an increase in carbon dioxide level in the individual's blood. This increase in the carbon dioxide level stimulates increased effort to breathe. This effort plus' the cloth produces the perception of "suffocation and incipient panic," i.e., the perception of drowning. The individual does not breathe water into his lungs. During those 20 to 40 seconds, water is continuously applied from a height of [12 to 24] inches. After this period, the cloth is lifted, and the individual is allowed to breathe unimpeded for three or four full breaths. The sensation of drowning is immediately relieved by the removal of the cloth. The procedure may then be repeated. The water is usually applied from a canteen cup or small watering can with a spout. ... [T] his procedure triggers an automatic physiological sensation of drowning that the individual cannot control even though he may be aware that he is in fact not drowning.
[I]t is likely that this procedure would not last more than 20 minutes in anyone application." Id. at 21. 6 Id. at 91. 7 Id. at 36. 8 Id. at 37. 9 Id. at 41-42. 10 Id. at 42-43. 11 Id. at 43. 12 Id. at 69. 13 Id. at 70. 14 Id. at 75 15 Id. at 79.
The abuse of detainees in U.S. custody cannot simply be attributed to the actions of "a few bad apples" acting on their own. The fact is that senior officials in the United States government solicited information on how to use aggressive techniques, redefined the law to create the appearance of their legality, and authorized their use against detainees. 22 As has been outlined in great detail elsewhere, 23 these acts of torture and of sanctioning torture were in violation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, 24 mistreatment of war detainees applied to al-Qaeda suspects, 55 a decision that contradicted President Bush's stated policy. 56 Hamdan joined existing court precedent holding that intentional infliction of pain for interrogation purposes "shocks the conscience" 57 and thus violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the standard adopted by the Senate in ratifying the Conventions Against Torture. 58 Again, Department of Justice lawyers responded by simply redefining by memo existing CIA activities until they complied on paper with the judicial rulings.
59
The legislative and executive branches having failed in their efforts to control executive branch torture activities, the only remaining hope was the Justice Scalia-touted "political check"
on executive powers. 60 But if legislative and judicial branch attempts to curb the executive branch torture crimes resulted in complete strike-outs, the political check was a sharp line drive finding its way into the opponent's waiting glove--a more promising prospect that nevertheless resulted in nothing more than the final out. General has no more intention to fulfill these obligations than the Bush-appointed Attorneys
General did.
Thus, in the context of multiple and egregious violations of the laws against torture, the political check on executive branch misconduct has been no more effective than the legislative and judicial attempts to sanction illegal executive branch torture activities. While Bush administration lawyers misstated the law on torture, the same lawyers were right on target in assessing the risk of significant review of executive branch actions. In one of the torture memoranda, the Department of Justice attorneys admitted that their permissive interpretation of memoranda author John Yoo gave oral advice regarding interrogation methods before formal memoranda were produced). 80 The defense of reliance on internal statements attempting to paint controversial activities as legal was rejected in After a new presidential election, the fox may no longer be guarding the henhouse, but he is certainly being allowed to slink away in impunity, feathers and chicken bones trailing in his wake. The country's founders, dedicated to curbing unchecked powers, certainly would not approve of this state of affairs. As it turns out, a review of the creation of the office of Attorney
General and the system of federal prosecution shows the founders never intended for the President to exercise the exclusive control over federal criminal prosecution that has led to this state of executive impunity.
II. The Missing Legal and Historical Foundations for President-Controlled Federal Prosecutions a.) The English and Colonial Traditions
As with many other aspects of their work designing a new government, the founders were informed by English tradition when they considered the creation of a chief legal officer. From the Middle Ages onward, the Attorney General in England was at once the chief legal advisor to the Crown, a consultant to both houses of Parliament, and the chief administrator of attorneys acting on his behalf representing government agencies in court. 88 Criminal prosecutions were instigated by individuals, but the Attorney General retained the ability to defeat a prosecution by 86 THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 18 at 272. In his analysis of these concluding remarks in the memorandum, David Cole writes, "In other words, when it comes to the ban on cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the CIA operates for all practical purposes in a "law-free zone," or at least in a zone where the law is what the executive says it is-in secret-and no court will ever have the opportunity to disagree. Instead, it was left to the First Congress to establish the office.
The Congress, too, did not seem to feel strongly about the need for a dependent relationship between the Attorney General and the president, much less presidential control over federal prosecutions overall. Initial drafts of the Judiciary Act of 1789 had the Attorney General being appointed by the Supreme Court. 98 The limited available records suggest that it was only conflict of interest concerns raised by the judiciary, not a desire for presidential control, which led to the Attorney General's office being created with a presidential relationship in the final sentences of the Judiciary Act:
And there shall ... be appointed a meet person, learned in the law, to act as attorney-general for the United States, who shall be sworn or affirmed to a faithful execution of his office; whose duty it shall be to prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned, and to give his advice and opinion upon questions of law when required by the President of the United States, or when requested by the heads of any departments, touching any matters that may concern their departments, and shall receive such compensation for his services as shall by law be provided.
99
Congress was silent on the question of whom the Attorney General should report to within the new government. As Susan Low Bloch has pointed out, this vagueness was in marked contrast to the Constitution's and Congress' very explicit efforts to invest significant presidential authority over the secretaries of war and foreign affairs:
Although the framers decided that the Constitution should vest the executive power in a single President-not a "plural executive"-none of the early interpretors seemed to believe that that constitutional decision dictated that the President have the same degree of control over all executive officers. To be an effective head of state, the President needed maximum control over the Secretaries of War and Foreign Affairs and, accordingly, was given the power to appoint and remove these officers and to direct their activities. 98 Id. 99 The Judiciary Act of 1789, supra note 33 at 92-93. Bloch also notes the absence of a significant record of why the final version of the Act included a switch from judicial appointment of the Attorney General, but suggests it may have been inspired by judges' suggestions to members of Congress. Bloch, supra note 97 at 571.
Attorney General, where centralized control was apparently not deemed essential, the President was explicitly given only the power to appoint; the power to remove and to direct were left unspecified.
100
Other historians have reviewed this same record and concluded that there is no historical or constitutional basis for concluding that the country's founders intended to establish criminal law enforcement as an exclusive function of the executive branch. There shall be, and is hereby, established an executive department of the government of the United States, to be called the Department of Justice, of which the Attorney General shall be the head. His duties, salary, and tenure of office shall remain as now fixed by law, except so far as they may be modified by this act. Berry and Jacob Gersen argue that "unbundling" the federal executive by adding one or more additional directly-elected federal executive offices, such as the Attorney General, would produce political outcomes that are closer to public preferences than those produced by the current system. 119 Peter Shane agrees, laying out the problem of the electorate choosing a President who is invested with the authority over an overstuffed portfolio of issues:
There is no evidence that the President, at any given moment, embodies that set of policy predilections across a wide set of issues that is held by a contemporaneous majority --or, more accurately, by contemporaneous majorities of Americans . . . [T] here is one most obvious reason why the President would mirror public opinion polls quite imperfectly --the President is a single person. Assuming it is even possible to identify, at a given moment, the full array of value judgments that various majorities of Americans hold across a comprehensive range of important public policy issues, it is doubtful that the resulting attitudinal profile would be sufficiently coherent to impute it to any single personality. )) (holding that prosecutorial discretion is "special providence" of executive branch). But, see, notes 97-100 supra for discussion of evidence that framers did not specifically address the question of whether the Attorney General would be appointed by the President, and the first Congress did not see Presidential control of federal prosecutions as a constitutional mandate. 133 See, e.g., Marbury, 5 U.S. at163. Berry and Gersen I, supra note 119, acknowledge the difficulty of enacting constitutional changes but also notes the trend at state and local levels toward more directly-elected executive offices and says there is ample reason to be open to such a change at the federal level. "The structure of the executive branch has changed enormously since the founding . . .As society changes, political institutions do as well. If old unbundled executives should be eliminated and new unbundled executives create, so be it." Id. at 1429. 134 Calabresi and Terrell, supra note 49 at 1696.
of voters, weaken the executive in contrast with the legislative branch, and blur the boundaries of executive power in times of national crisis.
135
But those arguments are well-refuted not just by the empirical evidence of effective divided executives cited in Section III here, but also by the dominance of prosecution by independently elected officials throughout the U.S. In 45 states, the Attorney General is an officer independent of the Governor, 136 an arrangement designed to check the power of the states' chief executives. 137 An independent Attorney General arrangement has never been reversed by a state which adopted it, 138 and is in fact the harbinger of a trend of increasing the number of directly elected executive officers at the state level. 139 While some state attorneys general have prosecutorial powers, that power is most often invested in local prosecuting attorneys, who are almost always directly elected.
140
A chief legal officer elected independently of the federal chief executive remedies the inherent conflicts of interest presented by presidential control over her would-be prosecutor, along with the oft-expressed concerns over the accountability of a judicially-appointed independent counsel. 141 This is not an unproven model, or even an imported one-rather, it is the dominant model of prosecution in the United States, where local chief prosecutors are elected everywhere except in Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island. 142 In those states, the criminal 135 Id. at 1705, 1712, 1739. Berry and Gersen are the main foils for the Calabresi and Terrell argument, but Berry and Gersen return the favor with a humorous but pointed refutation of any suggestion that an unbundled executive would lead to lesser candidates for the presidency:
The candidates most likely to run for president in the current regime who would not do so in the unbundled regime are likely to be candidates for whom aggregate power is the most important concern. These candidates prize being the person in control of everything. Perhaps this group of candidates make for especially good presidents, but they seem to have most in common with megalomaniacs. I n other countries, this would be a group of likely dictators, not responsive and responsible officials. Making the election of megalomaniacs or aspiring dictators less likely hardly seems a mark of shame for any executive regime. Berry and Gersen I, supra note 119 at 420. 1986), where the Minnesota Supreme Court outlined that state's rationale for independent executive officers: "Rather than conferring all executive authority upon a governor, the drafters of our constitution divided the executive powers of state government among six elected officers. This was a conscious effort on the part of the drafters, who were well aware of the colonial aversion to royal governors who possessed unified executive powers.") 138 Id. at 2452. 139 Berry and Gersen I, supra note 119 at 1400. 146 See, THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 94 at 321-22. 147 THE FEDERALIST NO. 52 at 360 (James Madison) (Tudor Publishing Co. 1947) "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.") 148 U.S. CONST. ART. V ("The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by Nixon's brazen efforts to place himself above the law led to dozens of Congressional proposals for reform in the investigation and prosecution of matters involving the executive branch. 152 These included unsuccessful proposals to make the Department of Justice an independent agency with the Attorney General appointed for a fixed six-year term, 153 to allow the courts or Congress to directly appoint a special prosecutor to investigate acts of wrongdoing within the executive branch, 154 and narrower but successful efforts to allow the Comptroller General, who is appointed to a 15-year term by the President with advise and consent by the Senate, 155 to obtain information from executive departments, investigate fraud in those departments and sue to challenge executive impoundments. 156 Ultimately, Nixon's over-reach led to the passage of the 1978 Ethics in Government Act, which included the creation of an independent counsel. 157 The Act required the Attorney
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General to investigate upon learning of alleged criminal activity by high-ranking executive officials (including the President, Vice President, cabinet-level officials, high-ranking officials in the Executive Office of the President and the Department of Justice, Central Intelligence Agency, Internal Revenue Service and the president's national campaign). 158 If she finds reasonable grounds for further investigation, the Attorney General was to apply to a three-judge panel known as the Special Division, chosen by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, for the appointment of a special prosecutor, which came to be known as the independent counsel.
159
Once the matter was referred to the Special Division, which was required to appoint the independent counsel, the Attorney General and the Department of Justice was to suspend all of their own investigations and proceedings in the referred matter, and the independent counsel would proceed with "all investigative and prosecutorial functions" the Attorney General and Department of Justice possess. 160 The Attorney General retained the ability to remove the independent counsel due to incapacity or for "extraordinary impropriety," and either the independent counsel or the Special Division could terminate the office. 161 The Act included a five-year sunset provision and was subsequently renewed three times, with some amendments, and renamed the Independent Counsel Act.
162
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act in Morrison v. Olson. 163 The Court first found that the Act did not violate the Appointments
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 164 which invests major appointment powers with the President, based on the Court's conclusion that the independent counsel was an "inferior" officer and thus could be court-appointed. 165 The Court then found that any separation of powers concerns were satisfied by the control retained by the Attorney General and the President to make the initial referral of the matter to the Special Division and to remove the independent counsel for good cause.
166
Despite the Supreme Court's imprimatur, delivered in a 7-1 majority decision over Justice Scalia's dissent, the independent counsel was widely criticized by conservative legal 159 Id. 165 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 672. 166 Id. at 695 ("The Act does give the Attorney General several means of supervising or controlling the prosecutorial powers that may be wielded by an independent counsel . . .Notwithstanding the fact that the counsel is to some degree "independent" and free from executive supervision to a greater extent than other federal prosecutors, in our view these features of the Act give the Executive Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.") scholars, who found the legislation to be both unnecessary and a violation of the separation of . ("After the Whitewater debacle, the idea of an independent counsel seems clearly doomed. Many Republicans have always opposed the law because of its anti-Nixon origins and because of its use against Republican presidents, such as in the Iran-Contra scandal. Now Democrats have equal reason to hate the independent counsel statute because of how it was used against the Clinton administration.") 171 Id. See also, Halperin, supra note 168 at 235 (the decision to allow the Independent Counsel Act to sunset "reflected a collective judgment by the Clinton Administration, Congress, and many leading scholars, journalists and other observers, that the benefits gained in avoiding abuses and conflicts of interest by means of the independent counsel law were outweighed by negative consequences of the law: the potential for abuses of power by independent counsels themselves, excessive expenditure of resources, and undue burdens on innocent officials.") (1999). ("You simply cannot have a criminal prosecutor, with so much power, subject to such limited checks.") See, also Rappaport, supra note 162 at 1600-01 ("(A) problem is that independent counsels exercise significant discretion but are not accountable to the electorate. Independent counsels perform important duties that involve a substantial amount of policymaking discretion, including deciding whether certain conduct by an official warrants an indictment. In a democracy, persons who exercise such discretion are generally made accountable to the public . . General to refuse to initiate an independent counsel appointment process even when one appears called for by less self-interested observers. 187 Indeed, to President Clinton, the take-home lessons from the Starr investigations was not that the independent counsel overstepped his bounds, but
.Independent counsels, however, have virtually no accountability because they are appointed by judges, take orders from no one, and can be removed only for cause . . . The Independent Counsel's lack of accountability is not merely a problem of democratic theory, but also of democratic practice. Because the Independent Counsel is unconstrained by the fundamental democratic check on policymaking--having to stand for election--there is a significant danger that she will behave unreasonably. The Independent Counsel's lack of accountability also deprives her of the political legitimacy that is crucial to the performance of her duties. 186 A practical challenge to legislation that removes the executive branch entirely from the independent counsel appointment and review process is that these very oversight provisions were cited by the U.S. Supreme Court in justification for upholding the constitutionality of the Independent Counsel Act in Morrison, 487 U.S. at 695. Even though it appears clear that the framers intended the Attorney General to be a weak office and did not envision a great deal of Presidential control over federal prosecution, supra notes 97-101, the Morrison reasoning would argue for the choice of an executive-appointed fixed-term Attorney General over a Congressionally-appointed investigator/prosecutor. 187 See, Chemerinsky, supra note 170 at 6.
that Clinton should have never allowed his Attorney General to request an independent counsel to begin with. 188 If one is interested chiefly in the friction-free exercise of presidential power, that may be a legitimate lesson to take from the Starr era. But it is anathema to a government built on a system of checks and balances. The Starr investigation showed that a truly independent counsel can lead to plenty of friction and inefficiencies in executive branch activities, but such impediments to the ambitions of any one branch of government were exactly the structure the founders of the country were seeking to create. 189 Reacting to the Starr investigation's flaws by removing independent prosecutorial oversight of the executive branch was short-sighted, and can be remedied by a revival and redesign of the independent counsel structure. Even if these or other suits succeed in obtaining significant civil remedies against executive branch officials who sanctioned torture and other illegal acts, they are best viewed as a supplement to, rather than a replacement for, criminal prosecution. Anyone in the U.S. who was recently treated to the sight of high-profile civil and criminal defendant O.J. Simpson smiling on the golf course or cavorting in Las Vegas after being found civilly liable for two deaths but criminally acquitted for the same acts 194 can attest to the significant gap in punitive impact between civil and criminal liability. 195 In the context of torture, the CIA Inspector General reported that the agents involved in the torture of detainees were extremely concerned about the potential for criminal prosecution of their activities. 196 Although that concern did not prevent torture from occurring, it is certainly possible the activities would have been more brutal but for the fear of criminal sanctions, or that the torture would have been significantly reduced or even absent if the Department of Justice had not issued approving legal opinions in advance. 197 Beyond the pragmatic analysis of the deterrent effect which potential prosecution places on official misconduct, 198 the larger question remains: in a system where no man is supposed to be above the law, why should executive branch leaders be subject only to civil liability for acts that would likely result in imprisonment for others?
There is precedent for allowing victims of crimes to transcend the limitations of a civil remedy by pursuing criminal charges. At the time of the founding of the United States, several states still followed the English tradition of allowing private citizens to initiate criminal prosecutions. 199 Victim-initiated prosecution is not allowed in the U.S. today, but in some (a) In exercising discretion to investigate or to prosecute, improperly favor or invidiously discriminate against any persons." 204 Since the Attorney General of the U.S. and high-level members of the Department of Justice practice law in the nation's capital, it has been argued that any decision to refrain from prosecuting executive branch misconduct because of the relationship between these attorneys and their executive branch colleagues-or boss-should subject the federal attorneys to discipline for violation of this professional rule.
205
In the wake of the Bush Administration torture revelations, there have been calls for disciplinary actions against former Department of Justice officials and torture memoranda authors John Yoo, now a law professor at University of California Berkeley, and Jay Bybee, now a federal judge in Nevada. 206 A pending opinion by the Office of Professional Responsibility, an internal ethics unit within the Justice Department, has been reported to include a referral to state bar associations to consider possible action against Yoo and Bybee. iii. Greater Investigative Power for Congress or an Inspector General
Professor Michael Rappaport has suggested that a remedy to conflicts of interest in executive branch prosecution is to endow a new Congressional investigative committee with additional subpoena powers and professional investigative staff to review and expose executive boost from the U.S. efforts to provide immunity for torturers from domestic prosecution, 214 it is unclear whether any of these actual or possible prosecutions will result in imprisonment or other penalties being imposed upon any Americans, including executive branch officials.
To date, U.S. executive branch officials have enjoyed an unusual protection from domestic prosecution due to the uniquely non-local nature of prosecution in Washington D.C. If an executive branch leader were to commit a criminal act in Maryland, Virginia, or Indianapolis, Indiana for that matter, the odds are high that the crime would be prosecuted by a locally elected prosecuting attorney. 215 But that is not the case in the District of Columbia, where the U.S.
Attorney's office, ultimately accountable to the President, prosecutes felony crimes committed under the D.C. Code. 216 Thus, though the D.C. Code contains provisions which could apply to executive branch official misconduct, including obstruction of justice 217 and bribery, 218 the same conflicts of interest inherent in federal prosecution make those charges quite unlikely to be filed or pursued at the local level.
However, District of Columbia officials 219 and legal scholars 220 223 If the bill were to become law, domestic monopoly over prosecution of executive officials could be busted the same way it is in the 50 states of the union where local prosecution is more the rule than the exception.
Conclusion
Due to a conflict of interest as blatant as the proverbial fox guarding the henhouse, two consecutive presidents and their Attorneys General have declined to investigate or prosecute illegal executive branch activities in sanctioning torture. If the U.S. is to maintain our aspiration to be a government of laws and not men, this structural flaw must be remedied. The direct election of an Attorney General is the most precise and effective remedy for this flaw. But a revived and improved independent counsel or provisions to break up the current monopoly over executive branch prosecution are also vastly preferable to letting stand any longer a system which flouts the principles of equal justice and checks on individual power.
